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It has been one year since those terrifying hours on the morning of August 29, 2005, 
when Hurricane Katrina began dismantling New Orleans. Thousands were left homeless. Many were 
stranded with no food or water for days. The images of the aftermath cast a light on government 
agencies caught unprepared and the pervasive poverty that had been hidden in the shadows. 
When families arrived in Illinois, they were welcomed, but they couldn’t escape the trauma of their 
experience, the grief and loss of their homes and loved ones, and a need to rebuild from absolutely 
nothing. Grateful for the reception they had received, these vulnerable families began the difficult 
process of integrating into their new, hopefully temporary, communities. With leaders such as 
Heartland Alliance and United Way of Metropolitan Chicago,1 the relief and recovery initiative in 
Chicago was launched quickly. A unique model of collaboration, generosity, and expert service  
delivery was developed, helping these individuals and families address their urgent and more  
long-term needs. 
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the goal of Chicago’s Katrina Relief Initiative was to provide a comprehensive resettlement, 
relocation, and community integration response after the immediate crisis for hurricane evacuees. 
Chicago’s response is now serving as a model for disaster recovery in other cities around the nation.
This summary briefly outlines Chicago’s response for the evacuees, who came to Chicago,  
what services they needed, and what we have learned to better prepare for future crises.
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Ricky and June used their last dollars for the 
first flight leaving the Gulf coast: it’s destination, 
chicago. Ricky and June were lucky to survive 
as they had been without food and water for ten 
days. Once in chicago, they were fortunate to be 
the recipients of free housing as they struggled 
to navigate the complex FeMa system. June is 
currently working and Ricky stays at home due to 
his fragile health. Just two weeks ago, Ricky and 
June got word the son they had been searching for 
for over 10 months, was alive and well in Texas. 
how dId ChICago welCome?
PoInts-of-entry 
Chicago’s 311 System, which was implemented in 1999, handles telephone requests from Chicago 
citizens for city services and information about city events and programs. It is a 24/7 one-stop 
shopping center for all non-emergency services. The City’s hurricane response began with a high 
volume of local residents calling 311 to offer temporary housing to the evacuees. Over Labor Day 
weekend, the City had Heartland Alliance make calls to the more than 1,000 people who had made 
housing offers. In a matter of hours, Heartland was able to match evacuees with appropriate housing. 
Additionally, United Way tapped its extensive health and human services network to identify housing 
capacity in the City as well as across the metropolitan Chicago region.
311 became one of three primary ways in which evacuees could seek assistance. Following the Labor 
Day weekend, the City began taking Katrina related calls within the 311 system. These calls included 
people offering housing or donations as well as evacuees seeking service. Heartland staff were 
connected to the 311 database and took over management of the Hurricane related calls. 
United Way also created an intake system which could be accessed via the United Way website or by 
calling a United Way call center, both of which were publicized via advertisements on the radio and in 
local newspapers, urging evacuees to contact United Way if assistance was needed.  
After initial intake, the evacuee information was forwarded to Heartland Alliance. 
The third way evacuees 
accessed services was 
through the Heartland Alliance 
voicemail and email address 
that were set up specifically  
to handle evacuees.
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evaCuee welCome Center
During September
The City of Chicago assisted with a coordinated response by opening a Welcome Center for evacuees. 
This welcome center, located at a Chicago Park District site, Fosco Park, became a one-stop for 
all the services that the evacuees would need, and initially operated 24 hours per day. Agencies 
represented at the welcome center included the Chicago Department of Human Services, Chicago 
Housing Authority, Chicago Department of Housing, Chicago Transit Authority, Chicago Department 
on Aging, Chicago Public Schools, Chicago Department of Public Health, the Illinois Department 
of Human Services, Illinois Department of Public Aid, Illinois Secretary of State, Social Security 
Administration, the American Red Cross, FEMA, Salvation Army, Heartland Human Care Services, 
Heartland Health Outreach, and others. United Way provided hundreds of volunteers. 
Evacuees were screened, Red Cross assisted with debit cards, and people were linked to other 
services as needed such as donated temporary housing, clothing, showers, meals, health screenings, 
enrollment in public schools, and expedited Food Stamps. FEMA representatives were present but 
only able to assist with registration by telephone to other FEMA representatives at the FEMA 1-800 
number. The registration data from Fosco was entered into an intake system and transferred to a 
spreadsheet for tracking and follow-up by the service providers. 
this collaborative one-stop model 
for accessing services is now being 
highlighted and replicated by the 
city and state for use with other 
populations and is being held up as 
a new model for disaster recovery 
response in other major cities around 
the country.
Lisa and heR chiLdRen evacuated from Mccomb, 
Mississippi to chicago, Lisa’s hometown. not only 
did Lisa have to survive the hurricane, but shortly 
after her arrival in chicago, she became the victim 
of a stray bullet. Lisa was hospitalized and had a 
difficult recovery, but she in progressing well in 
spite of this additional set back. FeMa assistance 
did not arrive until late summer, but in the meantime 
Lisa had enrolled in the Transitional Jobs Program at 
heartland. as a result of heartland’s assistance she 
now has a full time job and has moved her and her 
children, who are eagerly awaiting the start of the 
school year, into their own apartment.
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PublIC/PrIvate PlannIng PartnershIP 
StarteD in early September 
United Way, along with Heartland Alliance, co-facilitated two organizing committees that met to craft 
the recovery process, and later, for fine-tuning and troubleshooting to ensure the work continued.
relocation Coordinating Council for metropolitan Chicago  
The Council, coordinated by Heartland Alliance, worked with members to develop a recovery plan 
for the evacuees that recognized that many would be struggling with lack of stable housing, trauma, 
culture shock, and lack of post-emergency resources. The Council convened through mid-November 
to ensure the service model was up and running.
service Provider subcommittee2  
A coordinator from Heartland Alliance worked with the Chicago Department of Human Services and 
United Way to identify partner agencies who needed to be involved, engaged them in the process, 
and kept communication open and flowing. This became the committee of the agencies providing 
the services to the evacuees, and served as a mechanism to identify trends and needs and distribute 
funds when needed. The weekly provider calls were critical for adapting the service response and 
solving problems. This Committee continued to convene weekly through the end of June 2006, and 
the partners continue to informally collaborate to this day.
2 This was originally called the Administrative  
and Solicitation Subcommittee.
Services Provided to evacuees
n  Assessment and home visits
n  Resettlement action planning
n  Assistance with FEMA applications and  
ongoing navigation of the FEMA system 
n  Housing placement and retention
n  Emergency housing assistance
n  Household start-up subsidy
n  Housing start-up (as needed: security deposit, 
first month rent, basic goods, utility start-up, 
essential furniture)
n  Transportation
n  Clothing
n  Food
n  Linkage to public benefits and assistance with 
applications (TANF, Section 8, Food Stamps, 
disaster unemployment insurance)
n  Transitional jobs
n  Community linkages (mental health care,  
senior assistance, healthcare, job referrals)
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reCovery and CommunIty IntegratIon servICes 
StarteD in September anD fully operational by early october
In April, a notice was issued stating that FEMA funding for service provision to evacuees was ending 
retroactively on February 28, 2006.3 However, the program continued uninterrupted through money 
raised by each service provider as well as significant funding from United Way through the end of 
June 2006. Services to the evacuee families with the greatest needs after June were no longer a 
part of the coordinated effort but all agencies continue to work together informally to provide ongoing 
service to evacuees. 
Evacuees needed stable housing and to be linked with services– and this had to be done as quickly 
as possible. The partner agencies that came to the table needed to have the capacity and resources 
to provide services immediately. They needed housing expertise, housing resources, and experience 
with service linkage and case management. 
The Chicago Department of Human Services (CDHS) contracted with Heartland Human Care Services 
to provide housing support services with everyone who came through the Welcome Center at Fosco 
Park. As the service intervention was developed, it was anticipated that FEMA would reimburse 
the City for at least some of the service costs, as they paid other resettlement programs around 
the country. as of august 2006, fema has not paid the City anything for the services 
provided to the evacuees. for the duration of the program through June 2006, no 
government dollars were paid out to support evacuee services. United Way provided 
grants and loans to cover the costs of select services, and the providers raised private donations to 
supplement the services. The United Way Hurricane Fund, totaling $2.6 million dollars, has been the 
only source of large scale agency funding to the region to date. 
Originally, CDHS was going to contract to provide services for evacuees in Chicago. However, it soon 
became clear that services were not up and running elsewhere in the region, resulting in a service 
gap for many evacuees. The City decided to fill the gap by giving approval to serve people who were 
in the suburbs – understanding that most of those evacuees either initially came through Chicago or 
the evacuees had the intention of moving into the city. City funds could cover services rendered, and 
United Way of Metropolitan Chicago was willing to fund services to those suburbs that fell within their 
service area.
3 The service contract started with CDHS but was transferred to Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and Communications. The intent is for the City to be 
reimbursed by FEMA and FEMA set the February end date.
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In addition to providing services themselves, Heartland Human  
Care Services subcontracted with four additional agencies 
who had the requisite capacity, expertise, and ability to provide 
services in the suburbs as well as the City: Catholic Charities of 
the Archdiocese of Chicago, Jewish Federation of Metropolitan 
Chicago, Metropolitan Family Services, and Salvation Army. 
Heartland Human Care Services developed the housing relocation 
service model, created a tracking system, served as a referral 
clearinghouse to ensure that there was no duplication in services 
provided, and trained the other providers on what services 
they needed to deliver, paperwork requirements, and reporting 
requirements. Approximately 50 employees across the five 
agencies delivered the services. Additionally, The Sargent Shriver 
National Center on Poverty Law and the Legal Aid Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago provided legal 
expertise, when needed, for the evacuees.
Outreach to all of the evacuees who came through the Welcome Center at Fosco Park was done 
through a variety of ways. United Way and IDHS sent out a mass mailing to the evacuees on the Fosco 
list. In addition, the five partner agencies attempted four phone calls and sent out a minimum of one 
outreach letter to each family. In some cases, home visits were conducted. 
In addition to outreach, services provided by the five agencies included the following:
n Assessment and home visits
n Resettlement action planning
n Assistance with FEMA applications and ongoing navigation of the FEMA system 
n Housing placement and retention
n Emergency housing assistance
n Household start-up subsidy
n Housing start-up (as needed: security deposit, first month rent, basic goods,  
utility start-up, essential furniture)
n Transportation
n Clothing
n Food
n Linkage to public benefits and assistance with applications (TANF, Section 8,  
Food Stamps, disaster unemployment insurance)
n Transitional jobs
n Community linkages (mental health care, senior assistance, healthcare, job referrals)
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who Came here and 
how were they helPed?
The majority of evacuees who arrived in Chicago had ties to the City. Many people had either been 
raised in Chicago or had relatives or friends who called Chicago home. For instance, Tamika* moved 
from Chicago to Mississippi for college and settled there upon meeting her husband. When the hurricane 
struck, Chicago was the most logical option as her family could support her through the transition. 
Ruth* and her elderly mother evacuated to Chicago where her sister welcomed them into her home. 
They continue to reside in the family home and consider it their permanent residence. Others chose to 
relocate to Chicago because they were unsatisfied with the services they received in other locations and 
had heard of the relief efforts in Chicago. Ervin*, for example, first evacuated to Arkansas, next to West 
Virginia, and then to Nevada before finally settling in Chicago. Ervin is currently housed, working, and 
feels satisfied with the services Chicago offered.
Others who were evacuated to Chicago had very little choice. They boarded airplanes, escorted by the 
National Guard, and had no information about their final destination. Some were also picked up along 
the highway by buses sent by local Chicago churches. Initially many of the evacuees received services at 
emergency shelters and then either returned to the Gulf Region when it was safe or moved toward more 
permanent situations in the Chicagoland area.
evaCuees by the numbers:
n Illinois received an estimated 9,000 evacuees, the largest number of evacuees outside of the South.
n It is estimated that over 7,000 evacuees from 3,500 households came to the Chicago area immediately 
after the disaster. 
n 5,800 evacuees (2,900 households) were formally processed through the Chicago recovery effort. 
n From September 2005 through June 2006, over 1,200 households received intensive services from 
the Chicago effort. These are households, for the most part, who decided to stay in Chicago and resettle 
here, though families who chose to return to the Gulf Region were also assisted by the Initiative.
ages of evacuees  
who received  
intensive services
n As the coordinated effort ended in June 2006, just over 500 households were still receiving services.
* indicates name was changed to provide anonymity to  the evacuee.
under 18
38%
ages 18-65
57%
Over 65 
5%
 0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
evaCuee servICe utIlIzatIon  
and outComes:
from september 2005 through June 2006, approximately 700 of the 1200 households 
reached their resettlement goals including stability in housing and income. The results 
from these services include the following:
Crisis resolution: ensuring participants and all members of the household were working to heal 
and put their lives back together. This included navigating FEMA, assistance obtaining identification, 
linkages to trauma counseling, or returning to state of origin. 
stability: ensuring participants had access to stable housing, household start-up items, education, 
and support services as needed.
Income: ensuring that participants were employed and/or receiving any public benefits for which 
they are eligible.
Community integration: ensuring that participants received community information and were 
provided with an introduction to important Chicago services.
the flexible recovery assistance provided by the Initiative, such as emergency rental 
assistance and household start-up gift certificates, was central to stabilizing the 
evacuee households.
evacuee recovery assistance 
by Spending category
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rent and
Security Deposit
$487,695
utilities
$37,469
household 
Startup
$57,397
furniture
$139,180
transportation
$43,561
food
$55,205
clothing
$52,271
Misc.
$46,480
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homelessness PreventIon and housIng stabIlIty 
were a hallmark of thIs InItIatIve. 
The majority of evacuees in Chicago landed in tenuous housing situations. Approximately 65% of  
the families evacuated to Chicago were at imminent risk of homelessness. Homelessness was 
prevented for all of them as a result of the recovery and community integration services, particularly 
the emergency rental assistance, assistance in expediting the FEMA process, negotiation with 
landlords, assistance in transferring housing vouchers, and other critical aid. 
Of the evacuees  
still residing in chicago
 
an intensive transitional jobs employment program has been added to serve  
those who are still unemployed.
MaRie left the devastation of new Orleans for chicago 
as the majority of her family lives in the area. But 
before her departure, she returned to her home in 
new Orleans to salvage her personal belongings. her 
cat, who survived the storm, was anxiously awaiting 
her return. upon her and her cat’s arrival in chicago, 
Marie encountered a variety of struggles including 
being forced to move from free housing. ultimately, 
Marie found a place to call her own as well as a job at 
the university of chicago. as Marie begins to feel at 
home in chicago, and continues to receive FeMa rent 
assistance, her dreams of returning to new Orleans are 
no longer on the forefront of her mind. 
employed
unemployed
receiving SSi, SSDi, or SS
55%
25%
20%
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who Is left and  
what do they need?
While the emergency recovery phase has been successfully completed, more long-term service is  
still necessary. As the coordinated effort ended, just over 500 households were still receiving services 
for a variety of reasons. 
A group of evacuees have had trouble adjusting to and securing employment in Chicago’s labor 
market: the economy of Chicago differs greatly from that of the Gulf Region, a major adjustment  
for many evacuees. 
n Evacuees who lived in the South were often able to sustain themselves by working periodically.  
Not only is this type of work more difficult to find in Chicago, it is also less likely to be enough 
income to maintain a household with Chicago’s cost of living. 
n People often relied on social networks to find employment, and these networks are not as  
strong or are non-existent in Chicago for many evacuees. One evacuee, Antar*, had a job in  
New Orleans restocking cassette tapes in convenient stores and gas stations because a fellow 
Algerian connected him to the job, a relationship no longer available to him in Chicago. 
n Many southern states are “right to work” states, meaning people can find work even if they are 
not a part of a union. Licensure was also not as stringent. For example William*, who owned his 
own carpentry business in New Orleans, could not find work in Chicago because he lacked union 
membership and difficult-to-obtain licensures. 
n The types of jobs available in Chicago are also very different than those in the South, such as those 
jobs related to ocean industry (boats, fishing, shrimping, etc.). Raymond*, a professional fisherman, 
earned money in New Orleans each day based on the pounds of fish he caught. He has been unable 
to translate that skill to work available here in Chicago. 
n A group of current evacuees in services are struggling with barriers to finding or keeping a job. 
These barriers include lacking formal job histories, having criminal records, limited job skills, and 
not having a high school diploma or GED.
* indicates name was changed to provide anonymity to  the evacuee.
  
As FEMA assistance ends, people will be fully responsible for their own rent. a specialized 
program has been made available for those experiencing the most difficulty  
finding jobs. 
Heartland Human Care Services received funding from United Way to provide transitional jobs for 
up to 125 evacuees that need extra assistance with employment, and direct job placement services 
for those that did not. Transitional jobs is a workforce strategy designed to overcome employment 
obstacles by using time-limited, wage-paying jobs combining real work, skill development, and 
supportive services to transition participants successfully into the labor market. Since March 2006,  
49 people have been placed in a transitional job and 75 percent of them have moved into 
unsubsidized jobs. Approximately one-fifth of the participants in the transitional jobs intensive 
response have no high school diploma or GED.
finding and securing stable and affordable housing  
is proving to be a formidable challenge for some evacuees: 
The majority of the current evacuees in services reside in permanent housing, meaning the evacuee 
household has a lease in their own name. However, not all of these situations may be affordable or 
sustainable over the long-term, particularly without various forms of support. Over one-fifth of the 
current evacuees reside in temporary stable housing with friends or family but are seeking to move 
into their own apartment or house. The rest are in temporary housing which is typically a hotel or 
temporary transitional housing but are seeking to move to a more appropriate and long-term setting. 
housing status of evacuees  
still receiving services
While most people were initially able to find housing, many later realized that it was not affordable 
based on their incomes. They are now forced to find housing they can afford and must move  
once again. The providers are continuing to locate affordable units, negotiate with landlords,  
move evacuees out of inappropriate housing, and assist financially with the transition.
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Permanent housing
temporary stable housing
temporary transitional housing
75%
22%
3%
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evaCuees with prior histories of homelessness, mental illness, chronic 
health issues, drug use, and incarcerations are requiring a longer length  
of time in services. Some evacuees continue to struggle with issues that were present prior to 
the hurricane. These issues require a more intensive and longer-term intervention. These evacuees 
are being linked to treatment settings, the transitional jobs program, legal services, and other services 
as appropriate.
for many evacuees there remains a high level of uncertainty about what  
fema assistance is available to them in the short and long term. The FEMA process 
continues to be an arduous battle that requires the support of ongoing case management services. 
Many evacuees have received some rent and/or personal property assistance for items destroyed in 
their homes, but continued rental assistance is certainly not guaranteed and requires the continual 
submission of documentation for quarterly re-certification.
evacuees who have had difficulty proving their eligibility for fema assistance 
are still arriving in Chicago. The five partner agencies continue to offer services to these 
vulnerable evacuees.
MiLdRed, an 86 year old widow, was evacuated from 
new Orleans and came to stay with her cousin who 
lived in the south shore area. she was recovering 
from breast cancer and needed continued medical 
treatment. Mildred’s case manager   connected her  
to a provider with an office close to her home in order 
to further her recovery. at the same time, Mildred 
worked diligently on her own and with her case 
manager to maneuver through the bureaucracy to 
secure the transfer of her section 8 voucher from 
Louisiana to illinois. she is now living comfortably in 
her own apartment. she has also been connected to 
a home aid that visits her regularly to ensure she can 
continue treatments. 
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what lessons were learned?
1. Timeliness in the response is essential. Local leaders across business, government, and non-profit 
sectors did not wait for FEMA to do what needed to be done. They responded immediately to craft an 
evolving response. 
2. Relief and recovery efforts depend on an effective role played by government. All levels of 
government must plan to work collaboratively and in a coordinated effort. Government must be 
prepared to make decisions quickly, operate during chaos and know how to manage that at the local, 
state, and federal level. Government must know the needs of different communities and how that will 
affect the impact of the disaster as well as the response efforts. The City of Chicago displayed how 
government can respond effectively and immediately in its strategic use of existing resources and its 
strategic partnering with skilled non-profits. 
3. Partnerships are critical to creating a rapid response and ongoing success. The public/private 
partnership was absolutely critical to Chicago’s success. Maintaining open and constant formal and 
informal communications across partners is a key to the partnership’s success.
4. Non-profit capacity is essential for realizing a rapid response. The non-profit agencies that were 
central to Chicago’s success had the capacity and resources to add and reassign staff quickly in 
order to provide services immediately, and had needed housing expertise, housing resources, and 
experience with service linkage and case management. 
5. Considerable financial risk was born by the non-profits and the City who committed to serve the 
evacuees. This risk and uncertainty is inherent in the recovery response as a result of government 
inflexibility and lack of responsiveness, primarily at the Federal (FEMA) level. It is unacceptable to 
place this financial burden onto non-profits who have limited financial flexibility. 
6. The timely infusion of significant private dollars were essential to crafting an effective response. 
The private dollars raised by United Way and the non-profit providers allowed the initiative to hire 
and train case workers and get them out in the field by October, six months before FEMA had a case 
management program to refer evacuees to. Without the support and leadership of United Way and 
private donations to the various agencies, the non-profits would have been extraordinarily limited in 
their ability to respond to and divert a pending social disaster.
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7. Creative leveraging of resources and expertise that were already in place, without overtaxing 
systems, allowed the response to be rapid. By using the City’s 311 call center and a large, modern 
Park District site, the initial response was immediate. The partner agencies that provided the 
resettlement services brought to the table resettlement experience, emergency management 
experience, housing expertise and resources, and employees trained in case management, so  
the learning curve and start-up time was short. 
8. There is a group of critical services needed in order to effectively respond to the needs of 
evacuees. Vital services include rapid intake and referral to providers, intensive outreach, service 
linkages and case management, direct financial assistance particularly for housing, housing 
placement, and employment services on a spectrum of job placement to the intensive transitional  
jobs model.
9. The use of an information tracking system that is accurate, flexible, and user-friendly is central  
to an efficient recovery effort. This will enable responders to do their jobs more efficiently and will 
reduce access barriers for evacuees. Just such an information system helped prevent duplications 
and misuse of funds within the Chicago Initiative.
BOuaLeM, an algerian immigrant, had been visiting his 
wife in algeria shortly before the hurricane struck. he 
had been back in the us only a short time and had little 
time to prepare for the storm. he sustained a variety 
of injuries during the hurricane and steep medical bills 
followed soon after. ultimately, with his case manager’s 
help, the medical bills were forgiven and now Boualem is 
able to save money while working to support his family. 
he is currently in school and counting the days until he 
can bring his wife to join him here in chicago. While 
Boualem has been able to begin a new life here, it has 
been with very limited FeMa assistance. 
  
Chicagoland Katrina Relief Initiative
16
aCknowledgements
writing and editing
Joseph Antolin
Bonnifer Ballard
Charna Epstein
Laura LaBlanc
Sid Mohn
Amy Rynell
Jessica Weisbach
design and print
Graphix Products
organizations Instrumental to the success  
of Chicago’s katrina relief model
American Red Cross of Greater Chicago
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago
Chicago Department of Human Services
Chicago Office of Emergency Management & Communications
City of Chicago
Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights
Heartland Human Care Services
Illinois Department of Human Services
Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago
Lutheran Social Services of Illinois
Metropolitan Family Services
Salvation Army
United Way of Metropolitan Chicago
special thanks to James Bennett, Charna Epstein, and Laura LeBlanc  
for their coordination of Chicago’s initiative.
Photo credits
Tony Armour  p. 3, 7
FEMA  p. 1, 2, 5, 10, 13, 15
to the evaCuees
Your strength and perseverance  
in the last year has inspired us all. 
We wish you well.
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